Peace and War: Governmentality as a Military Project

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What do globalization and the war on terror share? The connection between these two frames for the present moment is easily obscured by the seemingly different levels of social reality they address: *globalization* names a broad and impersonal macroeconomic process, while *war on terror* evokes the military campaigns that the Bush regime has pursued in the name of responding to the September 11 attacks. This apparent difference echoes the one that Wendy Brown has observed between "neo-conservatism," the hawkish ideology of the Bush administration as it seeks to "intensify U.S. military capacity and increase U.S. global hegemony," and "neo-liberalism," which she understands as a "political rationality" of market intensification that began to build momentum as far back as the Reagan/Thatcher years.[1] In contemporary usage, the war on terror fits neatly with the neoconservative political agenda, while globalization represents, in large measure, the process celebrated and promoted by neoliberalism. In this essay I will bring these two formations together through a specification of their common genealogy and their shared biopolitical aims. Together, as I will show, they have precipitated the telling collapse of liberal society's traditional distinction between the internal and external enemy, as well as between the practices by which each is targeted: regulation and warfare, respectively. This collapse of internal and external threat is itself a consequence of precisely what globalization and the war on terror share: the unbounded surface of the earth as their territorial frame of reference.

In a critical reflection on Michel Foucault's biopolitical investigations, I will argue that these regulatory and military practices were never as far apart as they might on first glance appear. Born in the early nineteenth century, as Foucault argued, the regulatory techniques for managing biopower modeled themselves on an older conception of race war from which they borrowed the dictum that "society must be defended" against its internal enemies.[2] I will argue that the older form of war also survived this process, however, though reshaped into liberal society's ongoing bel-

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licose relationships with its outside: colonial warfare and the Cold War are two historically central examples. In contrast to the colonial or Cold War worlds, our most recent regimes of world power — globalization and the war on terror — are distinguished by their undecidable suspension between the rubrics of regulation and war. Indeed, I will ultimately suggest that the war on terror represents the moment when globalization at last openly reveals the military side of its Janus-faced geopolitical aspirations. Society must now be *globally* defended.

What happens when we approach neoliberal globalization through a Foucauldian lens? Like Wendy Brown, and also for that matter like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, I am interested in reading it as a biopolitical project for the regulation of a planetary population. But my emphasis differs from both. For Brown, neoliberal globalization must be understood in terms of what *differentiates* it from classical liberalism, namely the former's more sophisticated premise that *homo economicus* and market rationality are not humanly natural pre-givens but, rather, must be carefully and systematically constructed through strategies of governance. Neoliberalism, in Brown's reading, governs by training the population to regulate its own life process according to the economy of cost-benefit analysis.[3] Yet in reading neoliberalism at face value, Brown takes it at its word to be an administrative project, a code of conduct rather than a strategy of combat. Hardt and Negri, by contrast, make biopolitics into a subset of sovereign power, the right of empire to manage the life of the multitude in the name of the perpetual peace that it promises and upon which it situates its claims to political legitimacy. For them, empire does indeed reserve the right to take police actions, to enact sanctioned violence. But civil peace and juridical right are the legitimating conditions that direct these exceptional actions. As they put it, "interventions are always exceptional even though they arise continually; they take the form of police actions because they are aimed at maintaining an internal order."[4]

What if we approach war, not as an exception to or the opposite of regulation, but rather as continuous with it, as the point when regulation's militarism has surged into the open? As we know from Marx, capital's domination through the impersonal forces of the market does not eliminate class struggle. Rather, it represents the effective *waging* of class struggle: a population is threatened, disciplined, and positioned (using economic or ideological force) into laboring for someone else's profit. So too with neoliberal globalization, we must ask what wars it seeks to win and how it constructs its subjects as entrepreneurial, self-regulating beneficiaries of an ensuing global peace.

The war on terror's importance for globalization can be understood if we return to Foucault's founding claim about biopower, namely that the regulation of the life of the population is itself conceived on the model of war. It is through biopower, after all, that Foucault first sought to explain the emergence of genocide as the "dream of modern powers," itself inseparable from the twentieth-century phenomena of mass and multiple intersocial wars.[5] If globalization is the name that implicitly designates the "pacification" of populations in the name of world market integration, then the "Global War on Terror," as the Bush administration insistently calls it, should be understood as the territorially unbounded, politically malleable military strategy that this pacification actually demands. On this score, neoliberal globalization is perhaps not all so different from classical liberalism. Both ultimately guarantee the peacefulness of their civil order by conducting a perpetual internal war against wayward and resistant forms of life. They paradoxically assert a *simultaneous* state of war and peace.

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What is new, however, is that, for neoliberalism, the "population" in need of protection is global in scope. As such, there is no distinction to be made between internal and external threats. Everyone who threatens the globe's civil order is, at this point, conceived as internal to it but simultaneously also as fair game for the open warfare formerly declared only against external enemies. I begin by mapping biopolitics in relation to practices of war and peace, beginning with their origins in the seventeenth-century polemic of race war as described in Foucault's "Society Must Be Defended" lectures. From there, I consider the tandem development of "internal" governmentality and "external" colonial warfare during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Then I trace their international reorganization under the postcolonial condition of the Cold War and finally into the era of globalization and the so-called war on terror. This highly telescoped and partial historical excursus has a limited aim: to shed light on the current conjuncture by understanding the permutations now being played within a genealogy of liberal biopolitics that has long depended on a simultaneous practice of war and peace.

Biopolitics as Nonsovereign Power

Biopower has become a central analytic in the Left's accounts of the current political conjuncture, thanks in large part to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's *Empire* and Giorgio Agamben's pair of studies *Homo Sacer* and *State of Exception*. To put it crudely, *Empire* brought biopower to bear on globalization, and Agamben's texts made it relevant to the war on terror. Hardt and Negri's reckoning with biopower helped to reconceptualize so-called economic globalization as a juridico-political phenomenon, a quasi regime that regulates the planetary life of an otherwise dispersed human multitude in the name of the “pax” it establishes. They therefore locate empire’s prototype, not in the marketplace, but in a system of federation exemplified by U.S. constitutionalism.[6] By contrast, Agamben does not read biopower in relation to globality at all. Rather, he articulates biopower within a Schmittian conception of state sovereignty such that the fundamental object of its rule becomes the bare life of its population. In his provocative reading of the “camp” as the paradigmatic space of exception within which population becomes “bare life,” Agamben offers a ready model with which to theorize the war on terror at several levels: the apparent reassertion of state sovereignty as seen in unilateral U.S. military action, the activation of emergency “wartime” powers, the practice of rendition, the uses of torture and abuse, and the employment of threshold legal categories, such as the “enemy combatant.”[7]

I rehearse these tremendously influential positions in order to observe a debatable theoretical move they share: both Agamben and Hardt and Negri have swiftly brought biopower back into the orbit of sovereignty. Whether in the context of state or empire, biopower becomes, first and foremost, the revised object and the exercise of juridico-political rule. Now, this is curious. Foucault’s investigation of biopower grew precisely out of the *critique* of a sovereignty model that, in his view, distracted us from the newer economies of power associated with disciplinary microphysics and macrosocial regulations of the population. As Foucault famously explained, “What we need . . . is a political philosophy that isn’t erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the king’s head: in political theory that has still to be done.”[8]

Neither Hardt and Negri nor Agamben seriously entertains Foucault’s underlying proposition about liberal modernity: within the general economy of power, sovereignty (despite its continued visibility) has steadily retreated, giving way to less dramatic but far more effective disciplinary and regulatory regimes of power that can administer life from the individual level of the body all the way up to the statistical amalgem of the population. Even Achille Mbembe’s fascinating essay “Necropolitics,” while astutely foregrounding the practice of war in the exercise of power over life and death, does not relinquish sovereignty as modern power’s primary mechanism. Mbembe builds his case directly on Agamben’s notion of the “state of exception,” so that war and law enter a relationship of exception and rule in an analysis of sovereign power. The question of whether war may perhaps operate outside the principle of sovereignty arises only anecdotally, as Mbembe explores actual examples (rather than philosophical conceptions) of war in the postcolony that include complex spatial vectors of force, militias, corporate mercenary groups, and other nonstate agents.[9] In my view, this latter section of Mbembe's essay offers, in its perceptive reading of openly militarized contemporary biopolitics (comprehensible as complexly practiced race wars), an implicit critique of the philosophical groundings in sovereignty theory that the earlier sections had proposed.

Why are these theorists so ready to read biopower back into the sovereign from which Foucault took such pains to distinguish it? Perhaps this temptation exists because the population targeted by biopolitics possesses approximately the same scale as the "body politic" of the state. Perhaps Foucault himself encourages this conflation when he first introduces the object of biopolitics (in *The History of Sexuality*) as a curious inversion of the king's fundamental right over his subjects. While the king decides either to kill or let live, biopolitics determines instead whether to "*foster* life or *disallow* it to the point of death," deciding thereby when and where to weed out certain forms of life so that life worth living can flourish.[10] Finally, it is perhaps because we presume that only the sovereign bears the right to declare war. And yet, as Foucault explicitly warns us,

> wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who needs to be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; . . . this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.[11]

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As Foucault determined, biopower is the currency of a new and different political project that he terms *governmentality*, the art (and later the science) of managing bodies and things, life and wealth. Governmentality is a liberal political project insofar as it decenters the state from the processes by which it regulates the population, but it is crucial also to capitalism in that its object is precisely to enact a "political economy," a maximization of the relationship between wealth, territory, and population with a minimization of force exerted. Governmentality, as meant by Foucault, converges with the "mode of regulation" as the regulation school theorists of capitalism conceived it.[12] Both governmentality and regulation serve to designate the ensemble of mechanisms and tactics through which a conducive social environment for capital accumulation emerges, renews, or even improves. Since the time of mercantilism at least, the object of government has shifted from consolidating the power of the state (or raison d'état) to abetting what we call the "economy," the accumulation of bodies and things.[13] Governmentality therefore concerns not "the people" of national sovereignty, but people targeted as a population and an economic resource: “men . . . in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those other things which are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate irrigation, fertility etc.”[14] The population, along with its various statistical quantities (level of education, health, customs, reproductive capacities, and so forth), thus expresses a certain magnitude of biopower that government aims to mobilize and expand through its regulatory and disciplinary techniques.[15]

Liberalism and the Fundament of Race War

It is from precisely this point of view that we can begin to think of liberalism’s fundamental preoccupation with war. Within the realm of language, biopolitics poses “regulation” as the means to a peaceful and affluent administration of life. And yet, as noted earlier, biopower is born for Foucault amid the dream of genocide, and as a kind of inversion of the sword of the king. In the title to his recently translated 1975 lectures, Foucault describes the biopolitical imperative with the words “Society Must Be Defended,” suggesting that it is the model of war which ultimately invests the exercise of biopower. As Julian Reid notes, Foucault had in fact been moving steadily throughout the seventies toward an investigation of war as the origin point of modern power. In *Discipline and Punish*, he had already cited military discipline as offering portable tactics to be applied to civil order. Gradually, however, Foucault reached the conclusion that social pacification and regulation, the production of “docile bodies” and productive populations, had in fact *begun* as a military project. It is not just that the arts of war had much to teach political power, but rather that, reversing Clausewitz’s influential formulation, politics were reconceived as the extension of war.[16] Civil order and social peace become understood as a military outcome, the successful practice of a campaign vis-à-vis the population. Little wonder then that “genocide is the dream of modern power.”

The “Society Must Be Defended” lectures were centrally concerned with one question: where and with whom did this conception of power as war originate? Tantalizingly, Foucault concludes that biopolitics find their martial sources in an older practice of a “race war” against sovereign authority. By the early nineteenth century, Foucault presumes, “race war” was absorbed by biopolitical regulation. I shall argue, however, that race war did not go away but was instead redirected toward the constitutive “outside” of liberal society, where it has been continually reframed and redeployed in a series of major historical permutations: colonial war, the Cold War, globalization, the war on terror.

What precisely is this concept of "race war"? Contrary to Agamben, who reads biopower into a near transhistorical model of sovereign right, Foucault traces a mere four-hundred-year genealogy for modern biopolitics, affiliating it instead with an *anti*sovereign project: the conduct of civil war. Biopolitics does not begin in a juridical model of the social order, but in a partisan and historical account that directly challenges what he calls the classic "Jupiterian" history of the state. Derivative of the pax Romana in its expression of a regime's august might and peaceful influence, a Jupiterian history seeks only to legitimate the sovereign model of power. Beginning in the seventeenth century, argues Foucault, one finds the emergence of a radically different mode of history telling, one that posits social tranquility as merely a pseudopeace belying a continuous war between two armies, a war raging within the interstices of "society." He associates the origins of our modern concept of race with this notion of continuous war, articulated from the viewpoint of one people who have been subjugated by another one that controls both the state and its celebratory Jupiterian discourse. In recounting its history of race war, the subordinated thereby struggle to keep alive the partisan truth of their own subjugation, offering up a counterhistory to the official narrative of power.[17]

In this early form, "race" is not yet "pinned to a stable biological meaning. And yet the word is not completely free-floating."[18] What it does of necessity signify is a partisan divide within the populace. It may of course allude to "bloodlines," as it does in the distinction between the invaded "Saxons" of England and their Norman conquerors, or in the indigenous "Frankish" nobility overrun by the Roman-supported Gaullic monarchy. But in this moment prior to scientific racism, the narrative of race war is most fundamentally concerned with two peoples, divided by language, religion, place of origin, or some other formative collective experience who are nonetheless caught up in a history of mutual struggle. The two groups, Foucault explains, "form a unity and a single polity only as a result of wars, invasions, victories, and defeats, or in other words, acts of violence."[19]

The politics of race war are thoroughly ambiguous. It served the populist radicalism of the levelers and Puritans during the seventeenth-century English Civil War, but half a century later it would express the conservative agenda of the French aristocracy in their reactive battles against the absolutist monarch. Overall, Foucault stresses the practice of race war for the space of a counterhistory that it opens up and the fragmentation of sovereign authority that it seeks. Race war has granted modern history a flexible range of partisan politics, not least of which is the conscious practice of class struggle in the Marxist and socialist vein. It also enabled the kind of anticriminalization and antipsychiatry movements with which Foucault was engaging at the time of these lectures.[20]

Race war's dominant appropriation, however, is in the birth of modern biopolitics, a project that coalesces in the liberal triumph of the French Revolution, which successfully asserts the sovereign unity of the people. Race war's binary conception of society is now collapsed into a monist one, but the category of race does not disappear. Rather, it becomes explicitly biologized for the first time, and folded into a medicalizing project that seeks to eliminate unproductive forms of life that threaten the health of the social body. When biopower first appears, it borrows something crucial from the relationship of war, namely, the notion that "in order to live, you must destroy your enemies." However, these enemies are now no longer in a "military relationship of confrontation" but rather in a "biological relationship" to the life of the social body.[21] Instead of war, we have biopolitical governmentality, the managing of social risks, birth and death rates, public health, criminality, sexual perversion, and the like, for the optimal dispensation of bodies and things.

Foucault fails to raise at least two important questions, thereby closing off some interesting lines of thought. First, even though he links the emergence of biopower to the French Revolutionary moment, he does not ask whether biopower bears some kind of generalizable relationship to the project of political liberalism. Earlier in the lectures, he had rejected Hobbes and Machiavelli alike as possible originators of the military model for power.[22] While they certainly do not fit the profile of the "race war" partisans that interest him, they do both seem vital reference points for race war's subsequent transformation into biopolitics. Hobbes is crucial because, even in suggesting that the founding of a "commonwealth" leads to the cessation of the war of all against all, he makes it equally clear that that state now becomes responsible for waging war (in the stead of each individual subject) against anyone who threatens the common weal, whether from within or without.[23] For Hobbes, therefore, the perpetual war in the state of nature does not so much end as get redirected toward the enemies of civil society. Nor is this unique to Hobbes. While John Locke did not take the state of nature as one of war, in chapter 3 of the second *Treatise* he nevertheless spells out a natural man's absolute right to wage war unto death against any who threaten his property or life. As in Hobbes, the formation of a commonwealth displaces this right of war from the natural individual to the state: "He that in the State of Society would take away the *Freedom* belonging to those of that Society or Common-wealth must be supposed to design to take away from them every thing else, and so be looked on as in a *State of War*."[24] The king's sword is thus handed down to the liberal state in the project of defending the commonwealth. The very notion of "commonwealth," meanwhile, already anticipates the rise of governmentality, the shift from a politics of sovereign right to one that concerns the economic maximization of common wealth. All that is required, in a sense, is for "weal" (the general good) to become "wealth" in a more fully articulated capitalist sense.

Foucault also fails to consider what happens to the practice of race war following the onset of the biopolitical age. Part of the problem, as Ann Laura Stoler has argued, is that Foucault characteristically fails to incorporate into his argument the history of colonialism in particular and, in general, Europe's entire relationship to its outside: the peoples of the Americas, Africa, and Asia.[25] Although early modern Europe's internal struggles and civil wars also drew on the discourse of "race," our contemporary understanding of "race" discourse descends more obviously from the racialized relationship of war that it mapped in those same centuries between European sovereigns and native peoples in the Americas. If Foucault seems blind to this fact, it nonetheless seems probable that the partisan European mobilizations of "race war" that he cites (in reference to the English Civil War or to the French aristocracy) enacted a kind of tacit identification, or at minimum an analogy, with indigenous peoples. Race war, that is, becomes the partisan, politico-historical discourse through which one *indigenizes* a European people: Saxons or Franks become akin to "native" peoples, invaded and colonized by a hostile force that now conceals itself behind the peaceful mask of the state. One can see in this maneuver the racial kernel around which the emergent project of European nationalism will be implicitly organized.

In the era of biopower, the politics of race war drastically reverses. On the domestic front, with the ascendancy of liberalism, race war becomes aligned *with* the state and not against it, as a submerged language for articulating society's defense against its endemic biological weaknesses. In the context of empire, however, race war comes to openly articulate the practices of the colonizer. Marcia Klotz has incisively argued that nineteenth-century European imperialism oscillated between two different logics, one of which she calls "civilizationism" and the other "global biopower."[26] The former, a self-proclaimed peaceful project, practiced colonialism in the name of bringing law, religion, and industry to native peoples. Colonial atrocities, within this logic, are always either disavowed altogether or else acknowledged as highly regrettable bumps on the difficult road to civilization. In its pessimistic Conradian variation, civilizationism may attribute colonial atrocities to a reverse process, in which the colonizers have succumbed to the temptation of precisely the native savagery that they had sought to supplant with civilized ways. For all its skepticism about the colonial project, even the Conradian narrative preserves aggression as a savage characteristic, and leaves civilization, however fragile, as an untainted ideal.

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The secondary logic of global biopower, however, moves quite openly through the language of war. The notion of race is now biologized, as it is in the case of "domestic" biopower. But unlike domestic biopower, the colonial version retains the partisan language of race war, practicing imperialism as a struggle of biologically defined groups that tests the "strength of human populations—understood both in terms of racial bloodlines and monetary power."[27] On first glance, the externalist practice of colonial race war might no longer seem to take the form of civil war. But the matter becomes more complex once we account for the *globalism* of the nineteenth century's European world empires. If the globe is understood as the unbounded territory of the species, then imperialism as race war is precisely a civil war of "mankind." Through a logic that explains the relationship between "race" and the "human race," colonial imperialism enacts a global biopolitics whose militarism can be openly avowed in the name of a partisan, yet universal, humanism. Liberalism may therefore cast its internal exercises of biopower predominantly as a practice of peace, presumably because the population that it regulates is roughly coterminous with the sovereign unity of the people. Nevertheless, in the colonial era it continued to practice race war, though now in the name of a universalist humanism, through its external campaign against colonized populations.

This turn toward a civil war of mankind, as we shall see, becomes an important precursor for subsequent narratives of "world war" in its various incarnations. It accounts for the racialized language of World War I as a global struggle against the "Hun." It prepares the way for the lofty language of both World War II and the Cold War as humankind's two civil wars between free and totalitarian humanity. It even prepares the ground for Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations."[28] Under the sway of global biopower conceived as race war, the discourse of human rights becomes a mechanism for distinguishing between the tolerant and right-honoring zone of liberal civil society's "inside" and the intolerant, right-violating "outside" against which it perpetually wars.

The Age of Three Worlds: A Race War without Race?

Historically speaking, the endgame of the European empires coincided with the beginnings of the Cold War and a globe no longer imaginatively divided into those fit to colonize and those fit to be colonized, but rather into the so-called three worlds: capitalist, communist, and decolonizing. Like the colonial world, the postwar world also enacted the simultaneity of war and peace, but in a quite different relationship to race. On the one hand, the preamble to the 1945 Charter of the United Nations declared the founding of a new international order that would spare future generations from "the scourge of war" by maintaining a regime of "international peace and security" in which "armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest."[29] This chartering of "perpetual peace" was closely linked to the global repudiation of biological racism and race war, which the 1948 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights described as a defeated fascist ideology that had "resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind."[30] And yet, just two years after signing the U.N. charter, President Harry Truman would declare, without any perceived contradiction, a permanent proxy war against the Soviet Union.

In his 12 March 1947 speech to congress outlining the need to support anticommunist counterinsurgency operations in Greece and Turkey, Truman argued that U.N. objectives of world peace and human rights would not be reached,

> unless we [the United States] are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.[31]

The biopolitics of the Cold War moment are completely bound up in this contradictory formulation of "totalitarianism." On the one hand, "totalitarianism" is equated with the repudiated notion of "race war," because both fascism and communism are understood to name politics that wage war against both their own populations (genocide) and other ones (race war). On the other hand, the Cold War, understood as the global struggle against totalitarianism, was itself a politico-cultural surrogate for a race war that could no longer openly speak its name. Prior to the 1950s, anticommunism had openly appealed to antiforeigner, nativist sentiments in the United States, campaigning against domestic labor radicalism as WASP America's necessary measures of self-defense in a "race war" against immigrants.[32] With the global condemnation of racial ideology that accompanied the defeat of fascism and high imperialism, the racial dimension of anticommunism gave way to a struggle articulated instead as a world war between systems, ideologies, or ways of life.[33]

Precisely because it displaced race from the global scene of military confrontation, the Cold War always found its exemplification in divided nations where blood was shared but "ways of life" were not: in Germany most of all, but also in Korea and Vietnam. As the latter two cases may serve to remind us, the Cold War also posited a narrative of development centered on the decolonizing third world, now poised to decide between democracy and totalitarianism. Cold war against communism, as Truman explained, was crucial precisely because "at the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternate ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one."[34]

Many scholarly accounts reduce America's internal Cold War politics to a repressive operation of "containment" whereby the external enemy became a model for identifying and targeting internal ones: labor radicals, gays and lesbians, antiracist activists, all being treated as so many shades of pink.[35] Such analyses effectively capture the biopoliticization of domestic U.S. culture in exactly the military sense that interests me: to be blunt, it was regulated as so many domestic battles in a global war against communism.

Yet there is far more to say about Cold War biopolitics. The militarization of American culture also gave rise to modern identity politics. While the difference between the American and Soviet model was rarely racialized, it was openly attributed to differences in what got called "national character" and, shortly thereafter, "national identity." I have argued elsewhere that our current language of "identity" was born in the early years of the Cold War, conceived as a universally normative category that established the psychopolitics of peoplehood.[36] Erik Erikson's highly influential 1950 study *Childhood and Society* was the first major text to posit "identity" as the positive achievement of a self-determining sense of personhood for individuals and groups alike. From the start, this concept was both psychological (about the emancipation of the ego's inner life) and political (cast as the personality's capacity to decolonize itself from the social roles foisted on it by figures of power and authority). This concept spread rapidly across American culture, reverberating as well with psychoanalytically inspired critiques of fascism and colonialism (those of Eric Fromm, Theodor Adorno, Frantz Fanon, and the like) to popularize an antitotalitarian psychopolitics.[37]

Like race war in the seventeenth century, the politics of identity was highly ambiguous. Early on, it served the ends of American Cold War propaganda as a means of opposing American freedom to Soviet tyranny. Yet the free character of American identity was often cited by appealing to America's anticolonial revolutionary origins, a move that mimed the liberationist drama of third-world peoples. At one ideological extreme, even the hawkish secretary of state John Foster Dulles would proclaim in 1954, "We ourselves are the first colony in modern times to have won independence. . . . We have a natural sympathy with those everywhere who would follow our example."[38] In less than fifteen years, and from obviously different political positions, gay identity movements would declare solidarity with the third world in such organizations as "Third World Gay Liberation," while people like Eldridge Cleaver would describe black power and other racial identity movements as fifth columns for third-world revolutionaries inside the "belly of the beast."[39] By the 1960s, if not earlier, identity discourse would begin to avail itself as the basis for a new politics of race, gender, and sexuality in the "first world."[40]

This version of identity politics remains the politics of war, declaring as it does a rebellion, struggle, or insurrection against a pseudototalitarian regime: militarized Amerika, white supremacy, patriarchy. As in the premodern discourse of race war traced by Foucault, the imperative of identity politics resembles the formulation that "we must defend ourselves against society." Antiracism, antisexism, anti-imperialism, these were all identity politics, each asserting a history of subjugation that challenged the "Jupiterian" narrative of the pax Americana. But these politics existed simultaneously with those of the Cold War national security state, whose biopolitical imperative was that "society must be defended." The self-appointed task of the security state was to identify and neutralize internal threats to the American "way of life" by the various surrogates of communism: civil rights activists, feminists, gays and lesbians, radical students, and indeed all the partisans of identity politics. Were these "police actions" seeking to secure a domestic peace? Or were they taken to represent a domestic front in an international war? This remained a principal point of contention between the liberal and conservative blocs that alternately held control over the Cold War security state.

Against this backdrop we can now begin to place the neoliberal narrative of globalization. What, after all, was the "globe" that globalization envisioned, if not the imaginative collapsing of the Cold War's three worlds that followed the actual tearing down of the Berlin Wall? The former second world, specifically the former Soviet Union and its East European client states, would be steadily incorporated into such first-world conglomorations as the new European Union, while the third world, seeing no alternative to capitalism, would necessarily follow the lead of the East Asian, newly industrializing countries. In the fantasy of a unified globe, of one world coming to replace the three worlds of the Cold War, we again see the monist conception of society that Foucault attributes to political techniques of biopower. The difference, however, is that the national territory of "society" now expands to fill the globe itself.

In both the colonial and Cold War eras, an inside/outside binary obtained: the policing of "life" applied on the inside of the state's territory; on the outside one waged a war against biologically foreign "races" (colonialism) or against ideologically foreign "ways of life" such as fascism or communism (the Cold War). In the narrative of globalization, the discourse of war retreats while that of biopower and the "peaceful" regulation of the social body is projected onto the globe itself.

This is not to say that the world of globalization in the 1990s was not violent but, rather, that its violence was always effaced by the need for regulation. For once, global exercises of biopower disavowed almost entirely the military character of their project. Economic violence was merely "structural adjustment," every apparent war only a police action, every conflict with some "way of life" a managing of risk to the global social body.

It is important to recognize, however, that all this "peaceful" regulation, including the "police" actions in Bosnia and the Gulf, was justified as a necessary antidote to the perceived threat of yet another global race war: the Huntingtonian "clash of civilizations." In this most widely cited and influential prediction of the post–Cold War condition, Samuel Huntington claimed to foresee emerging antagonisms between seven or eight world populations, divided no longer by mere political ideology (as in the Cold War), but instead by far less mutable "cultural characteristics and differences":

> In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was "Which side are you on?" And people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations, the question is "What are you?" That is a given that cannot be changed. And as we know, from Bosnia to the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that question can mean a bullet in the head."[41]

In the Huntingtonian model, the Cold War retroactively took the form of an artificial truce in an underlying, permanent race war that tends to hold between world cultures. Huntington's position was not at all unlike that of Immanuel Kant in his essay "Perpetual Peace," where Kant had argued that the natural relationship of nations, just like individuals in a Hobbesian state of nature, is one of war, not in the sense of continuous "open hostilities," but rather in the "constant and enduring threat of them."[42] Kant, however, at least believed that permanent peace between nations could be established through social and juridical forces imposed by a universal federation of free states. Such a federation would in effect expand the liberal social contract to the international level, extending to nations the collective equivalents of the rights that free and equal individuals presumably enjoyed under the rule of law within any one of those nations. Both the League of Nations and the United Nations represented obvious efforts to implement something very much like Kant's prescription for "perpetual peace," a geopolitical framework whereby another world war could be avoided.

Huntington departed from the Kantian model primarily by rejecting the liberal political remedy for international or intercivilizational conflict. The post–Cold War world would now demonstrate unequivocally that liberal universalism was nothing more than the West's unique cultural endowment, a civilizationally specific project that other world civilizations could now be expected to resist as we returned to the natural state of world war.

Globalization, as the dominant strategy of governmentality at this moment, tacitly adopted Huntingtonian race war as the outcome risked by its own failure. In lieu of Kant's universal political liberalism, "globalization" named an alternative universal *economic* liberalism, hence a *neo*liberalism, whose narrative emplotted an inexorable (if somewhat uneven) integration of the earth's population into a geosocial order that would overcome the propensity for civilizational clashes. As Thomas Friedman, perhaps the leading popular guru of globalization in the United States, breathlessly put it, "globalization involves the *inexorable* integration of markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed before."[43] The very word "globalization" projected an asymptote toward which we steadily approached: the creation of the "globe" as a new domain of regulational universality (though not statehood) for the population of the species. The practice of globalization was thus strongly marked by its temporality of the "not yet but soon to be," fixed ambiguously between present and future, of which the "now" was a healthy but incomplete approximation of the "globe" toward which we ineluctably pressed forward.[44]

In lieu of Kant's universal political liberalism, "globalization" named an alternative universal economic liberalism . . . that would overcome the propensity for civilizational clashes.

This mode of temporality is hardly unique to the post–Cold War world. It reiterates earlier narrations of capitalist modernization, and as Dipesh Chakrabarty has shown in his analysis of the "not yet" positioning of the colonial world by European historicism, it also reflects the temporal logic of high imperialism.[45] It even has an immediate antecedent in the development narrative for third-world nations of the Cold War era. What does perhaps distinguish globalization is its seeming assertion that this temporal "unevenness" that is in the process of resolving itself happens within a fully interior space: the singularity of a borderless globe.

How does this economic coalescence of a globe serve as an antidote to the natural state of war between civilizations per Huntington? Certainly, globalization looked quite different from the "federation of free states" advocated by Kant and mirrored in the Cold War years by the United Nations. The fourth article listed by Kant for achieving perpetual peace, for example, was that "no national debt should be contracted in connection with the foreign affairs of the nation."[46] For Kant, perpetual peace depends on a juridical equality and a political federation of nations that must not be undermined by the economic peonage of one people to another, hardly a problem for globalization advocates. Superficially, “globalization” resembled the full realization of the “world market” as described by Marx.[47] But what distinguished the narrative of globalization as an antidote to civilizational clash was its *culturalism*, in the sense that it posited not simply the spread of capitalism but a kind of cultural integration of the human world (and thus an implicit overcoming of race antagonism in a very broad sense) that would match its economic integration. Thomas Friedman called globalization a “new international system” that served as the countervailing force to cultural conflict:

> What is new is the system [of economic globalization]. What is old is power politics, chaos, clashing civilizations and liberalism. And what is the drama of the post–Cold War world is the interaction between this new system and all these old passions and aspirations. It is a complex drama, with the final act still not written. That is why under the globalization system you will find both clashes of civilization and the homogenization of civilizations.[48]

If globalization were to succeed, as the very word implied that it must, cultural difference would thus gradually lose its frictional quality, becoming less an occasion for race conflict than for exchange and enrichment. A wealth of images, values, lexicons, and products would become increasingly free to flow, just like capital itself.[49]

Globalization’s narrative of culture thus mimicked its narrative of economic value, imagining a new world in which cultures would remain more or less distinctive (no need to fear homogeneity), yet would become increasingly available to all through their fungibility. One might say that “globalization” applied neoliberal market promises to culture, where the benefits of cultural value from around the world would be everywhere exchanged without restriction, just as everyone who became part of the new global village would stand to gain from the new circulation of economic value. According to Friedman’s “golden arches theory of conflict prevention,” civilizational clashes associated with our atavistic attachments to cultural specificity (symbolized by the “olive tree”) would give way to peaceful exchange under a capitalist order signified alternately by McDonald’s or the Lexus.

Ironically, Arjun Appadurai’s much-celebrated essay “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy” of 1990 tactily follows these Friedmanesque lines. While the essay begins by insisting on a contemporary “disjunction” between economy, politics, and culture, it rapidly institutes in the place of determination a homology between them in which the key metaphor becomes "flow," so that capital becomes the tacit fungible model for globalization's effects on the other "scapes" of ethnicity, media, technology, and ideology.[50] Appadurai's move tended to iterate in an academic idiom the dominant globalization narrative I am describing, including that narrative's disavowal of conflict or war as central to the dynamics of geocultural, economic, and political interplay.

Much more helpful, in my view, is the break with this approach represented by George Yúdice's discussion of the "expediency of culture" (and especially in the mode of "multiculturalism") in the era of globalization, both in the economic sense that culture offers exchange value to a major growth industry, but also in the political sense that culture is often deployed as a means of defusing civilizational tensions and thus race wars.[51] In this version of the globalization narrative, race is rendered into culture, which in turn is rendered as the pacifying process of consuming goods produced for exchange by an otherwise potential civilizational enemy.

Clearly, the narrative of globalization projected an imaginative outcome: the asymptote of a pacified global unity. But its application had practical consequences. During the Cold War, America had proclaimed itself a champion of democracy first and foremost, even if democracy was supposed to entail the economic option of capitalism (a free people seeking their human development would presumably always choose free markets). But in the neoliberal rhetoric of globalization, the presumption was reversed. The rising tide of free markets took priority, on the assumption that sooner or later this must yield a free people. The globalization of China, Korea, Egypt, or Mexico would eventually democratize them. Economic development should therefore precede human development, which explains in turn the urgency with which free-trade agreements were granted priority over human rights accords during the 1990s.

The transnationalization of capital accumulation, as Amy Chua points out, hardly leads to the inexorable smoothing out of ethnic, racial, or cultural strife. Indeed, it is her argument that the growing gaps between market-dominant minorities and surrounding populations actually fuels social resentments and violent reactions.[52] The response of globalization gurus, of course, is to naturalize the conflicts as ancient and atavistic hatreds that only *more* globalization will cure. But the point to be made here is that globalization (like any other form of governmentality) has only a limited ability to pacify the population it seeks to mobilize on behalf of capital accumulation. Whether the September 11 attack had happened or not, the veneer of an unstoppable globalization process might have been stripped anyway, as had earlier versions of modernity's inexorable temporality. Certainly this seemed a growing possibility after the breakdown of the November 1999 World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference in Seattle amid unprecedented popular protests, the advent of the first World Social Forum meeting in January 2001, and the demonstrations at the Genoa Group of Eight Summit in July 2001.[53]

The Return to a War We Never Left

If the premise that globalization was ushering in an era of civil peace was already growing dubious by 2001, then it was, ironically enough, President George W. Bush who dealt it the final death blow when he declared a perpetual war in his address to the Joint Session of Congress on 20 September 2001. Rather than responding to the 9/11 attacks as an international crime by a specific group or organization, he instead announced an open-ended and limitless war against unspecified enemies: "Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there," he proclaimed. "It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated. . . . Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen."[54]

Bush's declaration here of yet another world war, and one that reactivates the figure of totalitarianism, suggests where the analysis of globalization as a "pax" had gone awry. Although globalization discourse sought the integration of the Cold War's three worlds into one, it had little to say about the "second world," whose specific value as "enemy" it no longer referenced except in regard to the "defeat of communism" that served to preface the globalization narrative. For globalization cheerleaders, the contemporary second world merely became an extension of the third world, which would begin to prosper as it was integrated into a neoliberal global regime of regional trade agreements, direct capital investment, and export-centered industrialization. Antiglobalization critics responded that, in point of fact, globalization merely confounded the international division of labor between third and first worlds. Third-world conditions infiltrated the first world, in new shantytowns of migrant workers in Paris, London, and Los Angeles, impoverished cities that were once industrial hubs like Detroit, and in the general breakdown of the Fordist social compact throughout the former first world. Meanwhile, a first world of foreign business groups, local comprador classes, and new elites appeared within the third world and made rapid gains from the new flows of capital into the global South. Skyscrapers rise in Shanghai and Seoul, and gated communities spring up in Cairo and Rio de Janeiro, even while the cities' growing majorities live in expanding slums as a growing semi- and lumpen-proletariat.[55]

These criticisms are still timely and important. Yet one question they did not engage was whether globalization still needed an enemy. This question makes even more sense in the face of globalization's growing fragility and loss of its sense of inevitability. We therefore need to ask this of the current post-Fordist condition of global capital: how has it come to define its biopolitical threat in the absence of a communist world with a distinct sphere of geopolitical influence? Who is the opponent, in short, against which "global society" and its way of life must be defended? The war on terror can perhaps best be understood as a new development in which, for the first time, the classic external enemy of a race war has been internalized by, and incorporated into, the biopolitical project of governing "bodies and things" on a global scale. Terror is the name for a biological threat internal to the globe, rather than one located, at least primarily, "out there" in a discrete second world. While it is true that George W. Bush instrumentalized the World Trade Center attack for his own political purposes, it must also be acknowledged that he succeeded so quickly and so effectively because biopolitics had already prepared us for a wartime version of the new globe.

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Similarly, even if Bush's political fortunes continue to crash, and even if future presidents are Democrats, it will not be so easy to leave this "Global War on Terror" behind, any more than it was a simple thing to dispense with the Cold War during the second half of the twentieth century, or easy for the imperial powers to walk away from their colonies before that. Within the framework of perpetual war, political movements that dismiss the necessity of ruthless enemies against whom one must never cease to struggle are by definition "soft," unprepared or unwilling to defend society, and hence a security risk for liberal civilization in toto. As neoliberalism continues to erode people's sense of social and economic security, the appeal to the enemy only gains in importance. In the United States, we can therefore expect that Democrats will need to show that they can fight the war on terror "better" and "smarter" than the Republicans, but it is unlikely they will call off the campaign.

How in fact does the global war on terror differ from the Cold War, which was no less permanent and no less worldwide in its biopolitical objectives? There are at least two distinct approaches to this question: one that focuses on the nature of the enemy, and another that attends to the transformed theater for its battles. One might begin by inspecting the difference between the communist and the terrorist. For all its demonization, communism could never be treated in an entirely monological fashion during the Cold War. The word always bore reference to a historical movement with manifestos, leaders, and political parties in possession of a historically appealing critique of capitalist exploitation and imperialism. Even the fiercest Cold Warriors could not avoid contending with communist nations as members of the United Nations, or with communist leaders visiting the United States as invited guests. In these ways, the United States was led into a kind of ideological contestation that sometimes took on the rationalistic trappings of a debate. One might allege, per Truman, that communists did not mean to let people make a free choice between capitalism and communism, yet it was difficult to avoid acknowledging that a choice existed, one that even allowed for third ways at times, as the nonaligned movement that grew out of the 1955 Bandung conference demonstrates.[56]

Terrorism, while it mimics the -ism formula for political ideology, lacks precisely the external content signified by communism. It is important that the enemy seems not to be particularized, as *jihadism*, or indeed any term that possesses a political positivity in its own right. *Terrorism* does not name a substantive critique of any social order, nor an alternative conception for social order. It projects no "second world" with its alternative ways of life. Rather, the terrorist is to terror precisely as the criminal is to crime in Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, or the pervert to sex in volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality*. Terrorism becomes, like murder or rape, the naming of a deviant type against which society must be defended. This is the sense in which the external racial enemy has been folded back into a biopolitical project of the traditionally domestic sort: the surveillance, policing, and punishing of a race of "abnormals" who exist in advance of their criminal acts, and who thus should be detected, identified, and neutralized preemptively, before they actualize the potential social threat that they pose.

There is another level at which the Cold War and the war on terror should be contrasted, and that is in their starkly different modes of territorialization. The Cold War quite straightforwardly delineated an inside and an outside: on this side of the Iron Curtain, the free peoples following the leadership of Western civilization; on the other side, the totalitarian enemy. The model allowed for infiltrations, zones of contestation, and proxy battles. But there was a line that moved across the map, less a border than a front: Cold Warriors employed the language of "roll-back," "containment," or "falling dominoes." In the war on terror, however, the terrorists are thoroughly dispersed. "There are thousands of these terrorists in more than sixty countries," President Bush explained in his speech of 20 September 2001.[57] After being trained, "they are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction." This is the militarized mirror image of globalization's one world, in which there is no inside/outside distinction. We are everywhere, but so are the terrorists. The second world, we might say, has also been dispersed across the globe from the viewpoint of this new race war, and thus the campaign is an unbounded one.

This situation also explains why governmentality rather than sovereignty is the ultimate frame of reference. I do not mean to call into doubt a certain obvious reassertion of American sovereign power to wage war and, in the Agambenian sense, to "suspend the rules" under the rubric of a state of siege. My point is rather that we are being asked to construe a "Global War on Terror" that does not resemble a war between sovereign states, battling across a frontier. Rather, this is a war that openly concerns populations rather than sovereign claims on territory. It is projected and practiced as a war between a global "way of life" and the subpopulation that poses the biological threat to it. In this respect, the war on terror perhaps more closely resembles the war on drugs than the Cold War. The state has a role in this biomilitary campaign to be sure, but even in Iraq it is shared with other states, with transnational corporations like Bechtel and Halliburton, with Kurdish and Shiite militias, with a wide array of NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), and with mercenary companies. What we are witnessing is a neoliberal transfer of regulatory responsibility for the pacification of populations even in the most explicit war zones.[58]

If we translate this change into the language of biopolitics, it looks something like this: Whereas under globalization, every military confrontation was a police action, now we might say every police action, every response to the "crime" of terror has become an act of war. As Bush put it, "Al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the world—and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere."[59] Perhaps the most precise reading, however, is to say that the two sets of categories—the military and biopolitical—have been deliberately blurred, though under the sign of permanent war.

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As is often observed, the war on terror finds its institutional hallmark in a carceral archipelago: Guantánamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, the unspecified secret CIA "detention centers" and "renditional" prisons in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Khazakstan, and elsewhere. One could argue that these sites merely globalize the U.S. prison system. Julia Sudbury among others has noted that the tactics of humiliation and abuse used at Abu Ghraib were borrowed from domestic American prisons.[60] And yet, in theory at least, the American prison system is a juridical institution where techniques of discipline meet up with the sovereign power of the law. By contrast, these are sites, as Judith Butler has noted, of "indefinite detention," where even the formality of a sovereign decision concerning the legal status of the "enemy combatant" is continuously deferred. In the place of any such sovereign decision, suggests Butler, we get a system of carceral governmentality—the managing of an enemy population—that paradoxically displays anachronistic, localized eruptions of sovereign power (the figure of the soldier at Abu Ghraib or the warden at Guantánamo who treats the inmate precisely as bare life).[61] These ironies are themselves outcomes of precisely what Amy Kaplan observes as the "ambiguous territory" of places like Guantánamo, alternately inside or outside of juridical space as the need serves the war on terror. The law is redrawn, as Kaplan puts it, "to create a world in which Guantánamo is everywhere."[62] But where and *what* in fact is it? Not a domestic prison where constitutional legal redress should apply, since as the Bush administration has successfully argued it does not fall under sovereign American jurisdiction. Neither, however, is it a war camp; because there is no "outside" place against which the war on terror has been declared, the inmates do not receive recognition as soldiers and do not receive the protection of the Geneva conventions. I do not point this out in order to expose the administration's legal hypocrisy but, rather, to show how the very language it deploys seeks to collapse crime and combat, prison and camp, biopower and race war into an undecidable space.

The war on terror is thus the dark face of globalization, the result of imagining one world that is neither a pax Americana nor a peace of any kind. This is not a realm of tranquil capitalist integration but is instead a living world that must wage bloody war against itself, that must avidly kill its internal enemies so that life worth living can continue. It is now *global* society that must be defended. Globalization, I observed earlier, promised both economic and cultural wealth in a world civilization modeled on the market. The war on terror represents the military targeting of what globalization would consider *cultural abnormality*: beliefs, meanings, and practices of any sort that threaten or resist its Jupiterian vision of incorporation into a global liberal society. The biopolitical distinction would be between "normal" Islam and the "abnormal" kind that "hates our freedoms" and thus our way of life, or indeed between "normal" culture of any kind (defined as a way of life prepared to be fungible and expedient—so that it can join the marketplace of the global economy) and any kind that apparently wills not to be so. Whether we call this globalization or a war against terror, we must challenge a global logic of normalized species life that necessitates biopolitics without boundaries, and thus also war without frontiers.

Notes

1. Wendy Brown, "Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy," *Theory and Event* 7 (2003): 1

2. Michel Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the College de France, 1975–76*, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003).

3. Brown, "Neo-liberalism," 4–5.

4. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 38.

5. Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, vol. 1 (New York: Vintage, 1990), 137.

6. Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, 160–82.

7. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). Agamben makes explicit the relevance of his argument for the "war on terror" in the early pages of *State of Exception* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 3 and 22.

8. Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 63.

9. See Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics," trans. Libby Meintjes, *Public Culture* 15 (2003): 11–40, esp. 30–39.

10. Foucault, *History*, 138.

11. Ibid., 137.

12. I am referring here to the French Regulation School economic theorists, whose central figures include Michel Aglietta, Alain Lipietz, and Robert Boyer. To be as pithy as possible, the Regulation School distinguishes between what it calls a "regime of accumulation" (the specific economic practices that increase capital) and a "mode of regulation," which names all the social techniques and mechanisms by which a social environment is created that can maintain the accumulation process and defer crisis. They question the equilibrium theory of neoliberal economics, stressing the institutional frameworks that capitalist regimes continuously require to maintain their stability. It is not hard to see why this approach dovetails with Foucault's interest in governmentality. For a rich overview, see Robert Boyer, ed., *Regulation Theory: State of the Art* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

13. As Foucault puts it, "It was through the development of the science of government that the notion of economy came to be recentered on to that different plane of reality that we characterize today as the 'economic', and it was also through this science that it became possible to identify problems specific to the population; but conversely we can say as well that it was thanks to the perception of the specific problems of the population, and thanks to the isolation of that area of reality that we call the economy, that the problem of government finally came to be through, reflected, and calculated outside of the juridical framework of sovereignty." Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 99.

14. Ibid., 93.

15. For the connection of governmentality with the project of liberalism, see Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality," in Burchell, Gordon, and Miller, *The Foucault Effect*, 1–52. Even here, the state does of course play an important role in social governmentality, but only insofar as the end of governmentality (how to govern rather than how to rule) comes to infiltrate and displace the traditional sovereign end of "reason of state." It is a curious fact about contemporary "uses" of Foucault that critics have taken up governmentality and biopower along quite independent trajectories, but they are pursuing necessarily connected analytics bound up in a kind of means-end relationship. To the extent that the state becomes itself biopolitical, in other words, it has taken up the end of governing a population.

16. Julian Reid, "Life Struggles: War, Discipline, and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault," *Social Text*, no. 86 (2006): 127–52.

17. Michel Foucault, "*Society Must Be Defended*," 65–78.

18. Ibid., 77.

19. Ibid.

20. See the first lecture in *"Society Must Be Defended,"* where Foucault indicates his interest in the methods of archeology and genealogy as means of seeking to "desubjugate historical knowledges" that are expressions of very old social conflicts (10–11). We can then begin to recognize in the words of contemporary inmates and criminals the same insights into the machination of modern power that one unearths in the early histories of the prison, the clinic, the asylum, and other institutional sites where society's biopolitical enemies have been incarcerated and/or abnormalized.

21. Ibid., 255.

22. Ibid., 59.

23. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Touchstone, 1962), 137.

24. John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laselett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 279.

25. Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 14–15.

26. Marcia Klotz, "Global Visions: From the Colonial to the National Socialist World," *European Studies Journal* 16 (Fall 1999): 37–68.

27. Ibid., 50.

28. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Summer 1993): 22–28.

29. "Charter of the United Nations," United Nations Web site, www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html (accessed 27 February 2007).

30. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," United Nations Web site, www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (accessed 27 February 2007).

31. President Harry S. Truman, "Address before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947," online at the Avalon Project at Yale Law School, www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm (accessed 27 February 2007).

32. M. J. Heale, *American Anticommunism: Combating the Enemy Within, 1830–1970* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1990), 88–89.

33. All the same, the Cold War occasionally resurfaced as race war. Consider, as an early example, the explanation provided in George Kennan's "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" for the "particular brand of fanaticism" held by Soviet Russia's Stalinist leadership, which, "unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing of power. From the Russian-Asiatic world out of which they had emerged they carried with them a skepticism as to the possibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence of rival forces." George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* (1947), in "The History Guide Website, Lectures on Twentieth Century Europe," www.historyguide.org/europe/kennan.html (accessed 27 February 2007). Here, for a moment, totalitarianism appears as an aggressive racial trait that becomes the explanation for America's impending race war with the Orient.

34. Truman, "Address."

35. Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), Robert Corber, *In the Name of National Security: Hitchcock, Homophobia, and the Construction of Gender in Postwar America* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), Alan Nadel, *Containment Culture: American Narrative, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995).

36. I explore this principal argument in far greater detail in my book *Rebels: Youth and the Cold War Origins of Identity*. I do not explicitly frame the rise of identity discourse within the framework of biopower in that study. I do, however, connect it to the Cold War–Fordist mode of regulation, which can be taken as a special case in liberal governmentality: one in which the autonomy of the self passed through the category "identity," understood as a psychopolitical norm for individuals and populations alike. Leerom Medovoi, *Rebels: Youth and the Cold War Origins of Identity* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 14–24.

37. Erik Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: Norton, 1950). Related psychoanalytic critiques of fascism and colonialism include Eric Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Avon, 1966), Theodor Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, and Daniel J. Levinson, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Norton, 1993), and Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove, 1991). I map out this formation of psychopolitics more fully in *Rebels*, 4–12.

38. Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Foreign Policy: A History since 1900*, 3rd ed. (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1983), 504.

39. See Third World Gay Liberation, "What We Want, What We Believe," in *Takin' It to the Streets: A Sixties Reader*, ed. Alexander Bloom and Wini Breines (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 600–604; Eldridge Cleaver, "Domestic Law and International Order," in *Soul on Ice* (New York: Delta, 1999), 155–56.

40. In general I have argued that postwar U.S. culture *already* reflected a potentially transformative "three-world" politics by the 1950s. See "Cold War American Culture as the Age of Three Worlds," in a special issue on 1950s' culture in the *Minnesota Review*, nos. 55–57 (2002): 167–86.

41. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" 27.

42. Immanuel Kant, "To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, Histories, and Morals* (New York: Hackett, 1986), 111.

43. Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Anchor, 2000), 5; emphasis mine.

44. For other exemplary statements of this globalization narrative, see John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, *A Future Perfect: The Challenge and Hidden Promise of Globalization* (New York: Random House, 2003), or, even more openly for business readers, Kenichi Ohmei, *A Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy* (New York: Collins, 1999).

45. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 8–10.

46. Kant, "To Perpetual Peace," 109.

47. This is even the case for left-wing globalization narratives, such as that of Hardt and Negri, who suggest at one point that "the form of the world market

[may be viewed] as a model for understanding imperial sovereignty. Perhaps, just as Foucault understood the panopticon as the diagram of modern power, the world market might serve adequately—even though it is not an architecture but an anti-architecture—as the diagram of imperial power" (*Empire*, 190). How the market could possibly present any kind of model for sovereign power is unclear, but it is easy enough to see how it might present a model for governmentality, as a diagram for a non–state-centered economic disposition of people and things.

48. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, xxi.

49. Ibid., 239–64.

50. Arjun Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy," in *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 27–47.

51. George Yúdice, *The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the Global Era* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 9–28.

52. Amy Chua, *A World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 9–10.

53. I develop a more thorough discussion of the "globalization narrative" while also aiming to extrapolate a widening critique of capitalism from the praxis in Seattle in my essay "Globalization as Narrative: Three Critiques," *Review of Education/Pedagogy/Cultural Studies* 24 (2002): 63–76, a special issue edited by Imre Szeman on learning from the events in Seattle.

54. George W. Bush, 20 September 2001 speech to the Joint Session of Congress, online at White House Web site, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.

55. See Mike Davis, *Planet of Slums* (New York: Verso, 2006), and Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), for key studies of globalized cities in the former third and first worlds, respectively. Good examples of left-wing antiglobalization primers include Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello's *Global Village or Global Pillage: Economic Reconstruction from the Bottom Up* (Boston: South End, 1998) and William Greider's *One World Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998). I am obviously very sympathetic to these books for the way in which they subverted the "future perfect" tense of the official globalization narrative, unmasking its complicity in a global class war against peasants and workers. In this respect, these books are very much in keeping with the partisan race war histories applauded by Foucault. They challenged the efforts to create a Jupiterian discourse of globalization on behalf of those populations whom that regime tended to subjugate and exploit. How could they predict the return of the *wartime* globe and the project of the world enemy in 2001?

56. I do not mean to suggest by the genuine countervailing presence of communism that the third world was not devastated by Cold War contestations. Odde Arne Westad's *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Makings of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) provides a detailed history of the tremendous human costs associated with the triangulated rivalry. Nonalignment was in many ways an attempt to avoid being subjected to this danger.

57. Bush, 20 September 2001 speech.

58. See Naomi Klein's "Baghdad Year Zero: Pillaging Iraq in Pursuit of a Neocon Utopia," *Harper's*, September 2004, 43-54, for an incisive journalistic account of these privatization strategies in Iraq.

59. Bush, 20 September 2001 speech.

60. Julia Sudbury, “Globalization, Criminalization and Resistance: Women and the International Prison-Industrial Complex,” talk presented at the Cultural Studies Association Annual Conference, University of Arizona, 21–24 April 2005.

61. Judith Butler, “Indefinite Detention,” in *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (New York: Verso, 2004), 50–100.

62. Amy Kaplan, “Where Is Guantánamo?” *American Quarterly* 573 (2005): 853–54.

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